Consciousness and Cognition. The Cognitive Phenomenology Debate
 

Consciousness and Cognition. The Cognitive Phenomenology Debate

The main aim of this special issue of Phenomenology and Mind consists in promoting a reflection on the relationship between consciousness and...

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Consciousness and Cognition. The Cognitive Phenomenology Debate

The main aim of this special issue of Phenomenology and Mind consists in promoting a reflection on the relationship between consciousness and cognition, by focusing in particular on the question whether there is (and, just in case, how should be conceived) a phenomenology characteristic of the cognitive level of our mental life. According to a position which has dominated the debate in the philosophy of mind and in the cognitive sciences until recently (that we shall call “the conservative position”, exemplified among others by Tye 1995, Carruthers 2005, Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson 2007), only sensory states exhibit a characteristic phenomenal dimension, whereas cognitive states either utterly lack it, or inherit it from some of their accompanying sensory states. The conservative position has recently been challenged by several scholars (Strawson 1994, Siewert 1998, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Pitt 2004), who have stressed the irreducibility of cognitive phenomenology to a merely sensory one. [from the Introduction]