THE MARK OF THE MENTAL

abstract

In this paper, I want to show that the so-called intentionalist programme, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features, is doomed to fail. For, pace Brentano, the property that constitutes the main part of such intentional features, i.e., intentionality, is not the mark of the mental, neither in the proper Brentanian sense, according to which intentionality is the both necessary and sufficient condition of the mental, nor in its ‘watered down’ counterpart recently defended by Tim Crane, according to which intentionality is just the necessary condition of the mental. However, this does not mean that being mental is just a heterogenous category. For there may be another mark of the mental, i.e., consciousness, in the phenomenological sense of the property of being experienced.

keywords

Intentionality, intentionalism, consciousness
In this paper, I want to show that the so-called intentionalist programme, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features, is doomed to fail. For, pace Brentano, the property that constitutes the main part of such intentional features, i.e., intentionality, is not the mark of the mental, neither in the proper Brentanian sense, according to which intentionality is the both necessary and sufficient condition of the mental, nor in its ‘watered down’ counterpart recently defended by Tim Crane, according to which intentionality is just the necessary condition of the mental. However, this does not mean that being mental is just a heterogenous category. For there may be another mark of the mental, i.e., consciousness, in the phenomenological sense of the property of being experienced.

The architecture of the paper is the following. In Section 1, I will sketch the intentionalist programme in all its ramifications and show how it can be dismantled, by defending the idea that there are mental states that have only qualitative but no intentional features. In Section 2, I will attack what I take to be the best version of intentionalism, namely Crane’s version, according to which there are no merely qualitative states for all qualitative states possess the minimal features that endow a mental state with intentionality, namely the possible non-existence of the intentional object of a state and the aspectual shape of such a state. I will indeed try to show that there are mental states, namely moods and especially proprioceptive sensations, which fail to have both such minimal features. Finally in Section 3 I will try to sketch up to what extent consciousness, or better being experienced, can be the mark of the mental.

As is well known, Franz Brentano claimed that intentionality – the property of being about something or of having a propositional intentional content, i.e., a content that makes its bearer semantically evaluable (true or false, fulfilled or unfulfilled) – is the mark of the mental, i.e., the both necessary and sufficient condition that makes something a mental state.¹ By so appealing to intentionality, Brentano wanted to support the idea that that there is a class of states, mental states, which are irreducible to entities of any other kind,

¹ See Brentano (1874, 88-9). Following Crane (2001, 39), I won’t stress here any difference between mental states and mental events.
primarily physical states. Yet let me well put this intended consequence aside. For nowadays it already appears that Brentano’s claim seems hard to defend. For its sufficiency claim seems problematic: over and above mental states, there seem to be other things that possess intentionality, whether they are physical states or not. Nevertheless, Brentano’s claim may be kept in a weakened form, according to which intentionality merely is the necessary condition of the mental: for every \( x \), if \( x \) is a mental state, then \( x \) has intentionality. In this weakened form, the claim is nowadays defended by Crane – let me thus call this claim in its weakened form the Brentano-Crane thesis (BC).\(^4\)

If (BC) holds, then there are no states that are mental but do not possess intentionality. In particular, there are no merely qualitative mental states, i.e., states that have only qualitative features, that is, features that are relevant for the so-called phenomenal character of a state, for what it is like to be in such a state. So, defenders of (BC) also defend representationalism, or intentionalism, (from now on, I will use the latter label only) about qualitative states; namely, the thesis that the allegedly qualitative properties of mental states are identical with, or at least supervene on, the representational, or intentional, properties of such states, i.e., the properties including the fact that such states have intentionality.\(^5\) For, if there are no merely qualitative mental states, there are not even states whose qualitative properties neither are identical with nor supervene on intentional properties.

On its turn, as Crane has shown,\(^6\) intentionalism may be modulated in different ways, depending on how, on the one hand, the relationship between qualitative and intentional properties is conceived and, on the other

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2 To be sure, by “physical states” Brentano had something very idiosyncratic in mind, i.e., phenomenal states. See Crane (2006). Yet let me put this point aside.

3 Crane (1998, 230-1) points out that if one appeals to a naturalistic approach to intentionality, then some physical states, or at least some biological states, may well have intentionality. But even apart from such an approach, one may hold that there are other entities over and above mental states that have intentionality. For instance, propositions qua structured entities are about their constituents. See on this Sacchi-Voltolini (2013).


5 For Crane, intentionalism is the “view that all mental states exhibit intentionality” (2001, 8). Strangely enough, in the relevant literature there is little reflection on the fact that, qua supervenience base for the qualitative properties, intentional properties have to include intentionality. A notable exception is Chalmers (2004), who first draws a distinction between represented properties, i.e., properties that constitute the (propositional) intentional content of a mental state, and representational properties, i.e., the properties of having such a content, and then says that, pace Dretske (1995) or Tye (1995), qualitative properties have to be brought back to representational rather than to mere represented properties. Now, as I said before, having a (propositional) intentional content precisely is one of the forms of intentionality.

6 See Crane (2001, 83-5); the labels “pure” and “impure”, as applied to intentionalism, come from Chalmers (2004).
hand, what intentional properties exactly are. As to the first modulation, intentionalism may be meant in a strong form, according to which the qualitative properties of a state are identical with or at least necessarily supervene on its intentional properties, but also in a weak form, according to which the allegedly qualitative states have not only qualitative properties but also intentional ones, so that the former properties merely factually supervene on the latter ones. As to the second modulation, intentionalism can be pure, impure, or spurious intentionalism, depending respectively on whether intentional properties basically center around the very intentionality property of being about something or of having a propositional intentional content (a content that is constituted in any of the possible ways it is conceived of in the literature), or they also include the property for a state of having an intentional mode, that is, of being the kind of intentional state it is (a belief rather than a desire, a visual rather than an auditory perception etc.), or simply shrink to the property of having such a mode. The combinations of these modulations provide at least six sub-varieties of intentionalism. As to the first modulation, strong intentionalism clearly entails weak intentionalism but not the other way around: if an allegedly qualitative property either is identical with or necessarily supervenes on an intentional property, then of course it also factually supervenes on it, but the converse doesn’t hold. Both forms of intentionalism, however, have obviously to assume that, as I said above, the intentional properties of a state include the property of intentionality. Such an assumption also entails that, as to the second modulation, the three forms of intentionalism – pure, impure and spurious – are grounded forms of intentionalism only if the intentional properties they mobilize really contain the intentionality property. This constraint automatically allows both pure and impure intentionalism as legitimate forms of intentionalism, the former for according to it intentional properties are centered around the intentionality property and the latter for according to it intentional properties at least include the intentionality property. By the same vein, however, that constraint seems to rule out spurious intentionalism (this is why is so labelled), until one is able to show that appearances

7 Basically, a Russellian way according to which such a content is made only by the objects and the properties the state is about, a Fregean way according to which such a content is made only by the so-called modes of presentation of such objects and properties, or a combination of the two above ways.

8 These combinations further proliferate if intentionalism is meant as a reductive form of intentionalism, according to which no qualitative properties at all figure in the properties that constitute the intentional properties of a state, or as a non-reductive form of intentionalism, according to which qualitative properties may still figure within such intentional properties. For this further complication See Chalmers (2004), Siewert (2004).
notwithstanding, the intentional mode of a state has an intimate relationship with its having intentionality. This said, however, I don’t have to enter here into the delicate issue of which form of intentionalism is the best one. For the above assumption also shows that, if there is a mental state that does not possess intentionality, weak intentionalism fails, hence strong intentionalism fails as well, however either form of intentionalism is further meant – as pure, impure, or spurious (if it may so meant). This is what I want to show in what follows. I indeed want to show that there are mental states that only have, to put it in Block’s (1996) terms, mere mental latex, i.e., they are states that have qualitative properties that are matched by no intentional properties, for they have no intentionality at all.

This is a moderate form of anti-intentionalism. That is, an anti-intentionalist has no need to show that – to put it still in Block’s (1996) terms – there is mental paint, or in other terms, that all mental states that have qualitative properties are such that these properties may not even merely match intentional properties of such states. It may indeed well be the case that there are states that have both qualitative and intentional features; not only (rather obviously) emotions, but also (less obviously) all the so-called esteroceptive sensations – visions, auditions, gustatory, olfactory and tactile sensations.9 For in order to dismantle the supervenience claim that constitutes weak intentionalism – no phenomenal difference without an intentional difference – hence a fortiori to dismantle intentionalism in its strong form, it is enough to show that there are merely qualitative states, i.e., states that only have qualitative properties that aren’t matched by intentional properties. As I’m going to show, both moods and interoceptive, or better proprioceptive, sensations are mental states of this kind. Since the existence of such states shows that there are mental states that have no intentionality, intentionality is not the mark of the mental.

In the next Section, I will articulate my anti-intentionalist strategy as follows. First, I will enucleate what I take to be the most tenable conception of intentionalism, namely Crane’s (2001) version of it. Second, I will try to show why this version doesn’t work.

9 Almost nobody maintains such a radical form of anti-intentionalism, for it is natural to maintain that most emotions have both a qualitative and an intentional side. Yet Antony (1997, 25) is an exception. Both Kim (1996, 13) and Rosenthal (1994, 349) maintain the pretty traditional view that all sensations, both esteroceptive and interoceptive, or better proprioceptive, sensations, are merely qualitative states. Searle (1983, 1–2, 1992, 84), Rey (1998, 441), Peacocke (2008, 8–9,11) are moderate anti-intentionalists.
To my mind, Crane (2001) offers the best way to argue for intentionalism. For Crane claims, first, that the matching between qualitative and intentional properties of a mental state is independent of the state’s having a propositional intentional content; it suffices that the state has an objectual intentional content, or in other terms, that the state extinguishes its intentionality in its being about a particular object. As a result of this claim, allegedly qualitative states can be treated as merely objectual intentional states, i.e., as states that merely possess reference intentionality – being about something – rather than content intentionality, having a propositional content to the effect that so-and-so is the case. Typical examples of merely objectual intentional states are Othello’s being jealous of Desdemona or Vladimir’s looking for Godot. This point is a great merit of Crane’s theory. For the propositional intentional content that is ascribed to qualitative states as what qualitative properties at least allegedly supervene on is often an artificial matter. Consider e.g. Tye’s (1995) thesis according to which a state’s painfulness amounts to the property for that state of having the propositional intentional content that a bodily tissue is damaged. Since according to Tye this is the (propositional) content a pain shares with a state bringing pleasure to someone else (a masochist, say), it is hard to see how such a content can contain the property of being damaged. Second and more importantly, Crane claims that such a treatment is guaranteed by the fact that allegedly merely qualitative states have the two features that essentially qualify intentionality of reference, namely, the possible non-existence of the intentional object of an intentional state and the aspectual shape of (the intentional object of) such a state. The possible non-existence of the intentional object of an intentional state, i.e., the object that state is about, consists in the fact that there may well be intentional states that are about objects that do not exist, as for instance Vladimir’s aforementioned looking for Godot. The aspectual shape of an intentional state consists in the fact that the object a state is ‘directed upon’ may well be given in a certain way, under a certain aspect. Given this aspectuality, one may not recognize that two states are ‘directed upon’ the same object, insofar as this object is given in them in different ways respectively. For instance, Hammurabi thought of Venus both as the evening star and as  

10 For such labels, see Kim (1996, 21).  
12 See Tye (1995, 135). To be sure, for Tye the two overall conditions of the masochist and of the normal person phenomenally differ in the further feelings the two original states of the masochist and of the normal respectively go along with (a difference to be possibly interpreted in terms of further different content features).  
13 For a similar criticism see Crane himself (2001, 85).  
14 For the sense of this aside see the following footnote.
the morning star without acknowledging that the two celestial bodies are
nothing but the same entity. As a result, the qualitative properties of such
states can be brought back to intentional properties of such states.
This second point is even a greater merit of Crane’s theory. For at least with
respect to certain allegedly merely qualitative states, namely moods and
what may be called interoceptive, or better proprioceptive, sensations (pains
and pleasures, but also itches and tingles, or even kinaesthetic sensations),
intuitions seem to go in the anti-intentionalist direction. Even in philosophy,
up to some years ago it was quite natural to draw a distinction between
qualitative and intentional states and to deny intentionality to the former
ones – as Searle put it, the “of” in “I am aware of a pain” is not the “of” of
intentionality. So, it’s quite important that an intentionalist tries to run
counter such anti-intentionalist intuitions by providing arguments to the
effect that the contrary point of view is the case.
In this vein, Crane’s argument may be reconstructed as follows:

1. In order for a state to be intentional, it is enough that it is
‘directed upon’ something (that it has aboutness, i.e., intentionality of
reference)
2. The necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of aboutness are:
i) the possible non-existence of the intentional object; ii) the state’s
aspectual shape
3. Qualitative states satisfy these conditions
4. Therefore, these states are ‘directed upon’ something
5. Therefore, these states are intentional.

Yet this ingenious way of arguing for intentionalism is doomed to fail.
For one can well reject its premise 3): there are qualitative states that
are not qualified by the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of
intentionality, hence that possess no intentionality of reference. So,
their qualitative properties are matched by no intentional properties. As
a result, weak intentionalism fails; since strong intentionalism entails

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15 Aspectual shape can also be described as a feature that directly affects the intentional
object of a state: an intentional object of a state may present itself as the aspect of another
entity, so that a relevant recognition occurs when one discovers that two different intentional
objects present themselves as different aspects of a further entity. This way of describing
aspectual shape traces back to Meinong ([1916]1972). As to the present requirement, Tye (1995,
133-4) stresses that reports involving allegedly merely qualitative states generate intensional
contexts. Yet, as Crane (1995, 32-6), (2001, 11) rightly underlines, the linguistic phenomenon of
intensionality is at most a symptom of the mental phenomenon of aspectuality.
weak intentionalism, it collapses as well. As a further consequence, (BC) has to be abandoned. Intentionality is not even the ‘mark’ of the mental. In this respect, consider moods first. For Crane, a state of depression, a prototypical case of mood, is ‘directed upon’ the whole world as its intentional object.\(^{17}\) Now, given the above argument, in order for a state of depression to be about something, it must be i) possibly about an object that does not exist and ii) such that that very object is given in a certain way. Yet it is unclear how one can feel oneself depressed towards a non-existent world and how depression can have an aspectual shape, that is, how the world can be given in one’s depression in a way that may well make its bearer fail to recognize that it is the same object differently given in another intentional state.\(^{18}\)

Crane’s rejoinder to this problem is that moods are complex mental states, so that first, they have to be reduced to simpler qualitative states that, second, can be shown to be intentional states.\(^{19}\) Yet consider pains, or any other intero or proprioceptive sensation for that matter. Crane acknowledges that pains are simple mental qualitative states. For him, moreover, their being pains can be traced back to the fact that they are ‘directed upon’ bodily parts. More precisely, such a ‘directionality’ makes pains objectual intentional states insofar as not only they may be ‘directed upon’ objects – bodily parts – that do not exist but also they possess aspectual shape. On the one hand, the ‘phantom limb’- case shows that there are cases in which the intentional object of the sensation does not exist: in feeling pain in such a case, one indeed feels a bodily part that does not exist. On the other hand, it may well occur that a bodily part, say a leg, is presented \textit{in a certain} way in a pain, yet it is not so presented when one is aware of that part in other sense modalities (e.g. in outer perception).\(^{20}\)

Once again, on behalf of Crane a more limited argument can be reconstructed as follows:

\(^{17}\) “In depression, the world seems to the subject to be a pointless, colourless place: nothing seems worth doing. The change involved in coming out of a depression is partly a change in the subject’s apprehension of the world (1998, 242). This idea is also shared by Lycan (2001, 28). Yet Lycan adds that depression has a \textit{propositional} intentional content. Since as I said I think that a propositionalist intentionalist account is independently problematic, I leave Lycan’s proposal aside.

\(^{18}\) To be sure, this problem may be circumvented if by “the whole world” one does not mean an entire universe but just a very significant part of it, such as our Earth. (I owe this suggestion to Uriah Kriegel.) Yet this would implausibly mean that if one travelled across the universe her depression would change its object or even more radically, if as Crane believes the intentional object of a state individuates it – See (2001, 82-3), it would become a different state.

\(^{19}\) See Crane (2009).

1. In order for a state to be intentional, it is enough that it is 'directed upon' something (that it has aboutness, i.e., intentionality of reference).
2. The necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of aboutness are:
   i) the possible non-existence of the intentional object; ii) the state's aspectual shape.
3'. Proprioceptive sensations are characterized by both the possible non-existence of their intentional object and the sensation's aspectual shape.
4'. Therefore, a proprioceptive sensation is 'directed upon' an object – which is a certain part of one's body, the part one feels in one's sensation.
5'. Therefore, these sensations are intentional.

Once again, in the above argument the third premise, i.e. 3’, is the most important one. For it allows Crane to reject other possible objectualist accounts of the intentionality of proprioceptive sensations, such as the idea that a sensation has a *sui generis* intentional object, for example a pain is 'directed upon' a pain-object.21 Appealing to sensation-objects looks very much like a 'Brentanian' immanentist account according to which a proprioceptive sensation indeed is a merely objectual intentional state yet its intentional object is something that merely 'in-exists' in the state, i.e., it is an immanent entity that depends for its existence on the very existence of the state that is 'directed upon' it. Yet definitely, an immanent object does not allow the state allegedly 'directed upon' it to have the two features that qualify intentionality of reference. First of all, there are no non-existent immanent intentional objects: immanent objects always exist, though as we have just seen in a dependent form. Moreover, immanent objects do not allow the states allegedly 'directed upon' them to have an aspectual shape. For there is no chance that the immanent object a certain state is 'directed upon' and the immanent object another state is direction upon are nothing but the very same entity to be recognized as given in different ways.

Now, 3' seems to be well supported. For the 'phantom limb'- case and the case in which one and the same entity is given in different ways in a pain and in another sensation respectively seem precisely to show that proprioceptive sensations possess the properties featuring reference intentionality, i.e., the possible non-existence of the intentional object of an intentional state.

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21 To be sure, Crane limits himself to saying that pain-objects are “obscure entities” (2001, 81).
and the aspectual shape of the state. However, it can be shown that premise 3’ of the above limited argument fails as well. Pains (or any other intero or proprioceptive sensation for that matter) are no objectual intentional states. For appearances notwithstanding, they do not possess the above features that admittedly qualify intentionality of reference.

Let me begin with whether pains are qualified by the possible non-existence of the intentional object. Granted, we localize pains. We immediately ascribe to our pains a location, typically in a part of our body; quite unreflectively, we say that we feel a pain in our head, or in our leg. Yet such a practice does not per se provide a justification to the idea that pains are ‘directed upon’ bodily portions that might even not exist, as Crane holds. What the ‘phantom limb’-case merely shows is that the location we ascribe to our pains is merely apparent: for a pain to be ascribed a certain location is just to merely take it as being located in a certain part of the body, where such an ascription may well be false. Clearly this is how things stand is in the ‘phantom limb’-case, in which one locates a pain in a limb that does not exist. Yet there are other situations of the same kind that do not involve non-existent bodily parts, as when one locates an itch where one’s skin is not irritated.

So, we have at our disposal an alternative description of the phenomenon in question, pain localization, that does not support the idea that pain is an intentional state ‘directed upon’ a certain bodily part. To be sure, Crane considers this suggestion yet just in order to discard it immediately: to localize a pain is something more, he says, than to associate the sensation a belief (possibly false) in such a location. Yet pace Crane, to speak of an apparent location of a pain is not to associate the sensation a belief (possibly false) in such a location. Rather, it simply amounts to taking the sensation’s possession of that property as illusory, as in optical illusions. For example, when I see the oar in water as crooked I do not believe that the oar is crooked – I know that this is not the case – yet I am forced to so see it.

An anti-intentionalist might even stop here. For she may appeal to the fact that, as we saw before, it is rather unintuitive to treat a proprioceptive sensation as an intentional state, as much as it was to analogously treat a

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22 If one likes, one may put things in the following terms: we truly ascribe our pains an appearance property, the property of seeming to be located at t in a certain bodily part. As Wittgenstein (1975, §61) originally suggested, such an appearance property may contribute to the individuation of the sensation in question, along with other features – e.g. intensity. For similar considerations, see Peacocke (2008, 11-2). By later focusing on the case of migrant sensations, we will soon see why the temporal specification in such an appearance property is important.

23 Possibly, this is the case as far as all pains are concerned, for if they have a genuine location, this is situated in our brain. Yet I cannot here deal with this point, which involves a materialist conception of pains (or of intero or proprioceptive sensations for that matter).

mood: while we commonsensically think that states such as beliefs and outer perceptions have intentional objects, we have no intuition that not only moods but also intero or proprioceptive sensations have such objects, so that we incredulously stare at proposals that go along this direction. So, even if up to now the two stories concerning pains, the intentionalist and the anti-intentionalist, are on a par, given the pretheoretical intuitions, the burden of the proof is on the intentionalist to show that she is right. Yet there is more than that in favor of the anti-intentionalist story. Pains may be taken as located somewhere even in absence of any physical entity whatsoever, whether existent or not, corresponding to that location. As Wittgenstein originally said, it is not only conceivable, but also both metaphysically and nomologically possible, that one feels her pain not in her body, but in some other’s body: for instance, I may feel a pain in your teeth, or so one would say. Yet Wittgenstein’s example may be radicalized: one may feel a pain not only in someone else’s body, but also in some merely physical object – say, the armchair out there or even in no physical object, but merely in the surrounding air, where no object at all is located nor it is erroneously said to be located (as in the ‘phantom limb’- case). In such a case, one would be prompted to say that one feels a pain in the air out there. (If one likes, one may tell a plausible story as to how such a case is nomologically, hence metaphysically, possible. As different laser rays fuse themselves in a certain location in the surrounding air, that location becomes the source from which a single laser ray is shoot against me. As such a ray directly hits my brain, my sensation-underlying neurons fire. Yet since the ray’s source is out there in the surrounding air, I am forced to say that I feel pain in that piece of air.) Yet there would be no object, not even a non-existent one, that pain would be ‘directed upon’. So, pains are not even possibly ‘directed upon’ objects that do not exist. On behalf of Crane, one might reply to this putative counterexample by changing the kind of intentional object a pain is ‘directed upon’: rather than a bodily part, one may say that a pain is about the space region typically occupied by one such part. Accordingly, one may say that the pain in question is ‘directed upon’ a portion of space –the portion out there – which is simply occupied by no physical entity. Yet this reply has even more implausible consequences. Often, when we feel a certain pain, we move around in the surrounding space. Yet if the objects of our pains were space regions we would be oddly forced to say that a pain changes its object as soon as its

25 See Wittgenstein (1975, §63).
26 The example is suggested (but not endorsed) by Wittgenstein in his reflecting on muscular sensations as the basis for one’s will to act (See 1961, 87–8). Rabdomants sometimes say that they feel something at the tip of their sticks.
bearer moves around. Moreover, if we individuate pains also by means of their
intentional object, as Crane is inclined to say,27 we would be even forced to say
that our pains become different mental states as we move around.
Let me now pass to consider whether pains have aspeccual shape. As I said
before on behalf of Crane’s proposal, ascribing aspeccual shape to pains is
prima facie plausible. For pains seem to mobilize discoveries of the same kind
as those that are mobilized in the prototypical cases in which we discover that
it is one and the same object that is given twice in two different intentional
states respectively. In this respect, it seems that we can truly say things like
“Aha! What I see is the leg that I feel” in the very same vein as when we truly
say “the evening star is the morning star”.
Yet a moment’s reflection shows that the above analogy is nothing more than
an analogy. Informative identities in which one discovers that an object given
in a certain way – say, the evening star – is nothing but another object given
in another way – say, the morning star – are atemporal, or better longlasting.
When one discovers that the evening star is the morning star, one discovers a
fact that pre-existed to the discovery for it generated along with Venus’ own
generation and will last at least as much as Venus exists. Yet whatever one
discovers when one discovers that what one feels is e.g. what one sees, one
discovers something temporal, or better ephemeral, something that obtains at
the time of the discovery but it may well cease to obtain after it.
This is clearly shown by the fact that pain can migrate, in the sense that we
can well ascribe different locations to one and the same pain in different
times. Migrant pains indeed show that the informative identities one may
allegedly discover involving pains and bodily parts are at most temporalized
identities: for example, one may discover that what one feels is at t the left
big toe (that one then sees), but is at t’ the left index finger (that one then
sees). Yet such temporalized identities ground no alleged aspeccual character
of the sensations involved, for such a character would rather require a non-
temporalized identity of the “the evening star is the morning star”- type.
One may see the situation at stake more deeply if one reflects on the fact
that, as I said before, pain localization is nothing more than an ascription of
location. For one may then clearly see that speaking of temporalized identities
is just a rough way of talking of what’s really going on. Insofar as they are
migrant, pains are ascribed different locations in different times. Such
locations are described in terms of bodily parts, but they should be

27 See fn. 18.
better described in terms of the space regions that such bodily parts occupy 
(in case such parts exist). So what it is really going on in the situation at 
stance is that now (a certain bit of time) one (says that one) feels a certain 
pain in this place, which is the place that (say) one’s left big toe occupies, and 
now (another bit of time) one (says that one) feels that very pain in this other 
place, which is the place that (say) one’s left index finger occupies.\textsuperscript{28} Granted, 
these latter identities – this place is the place that one’s left big toe occupies, 
this other place is the place that one’s left index finger occupies – are non-
temporalized identities of the “the evening star is the morning star” – kind. 
Yet clearly enough, such identities ground no alleged aspeccual character of 
the sensation. 
To be sure, Crane may appeal to his conviction that the intentional object of a 
sensation individuates it in order to say that what one feels at \(t\), namely one’s 
big left toe, is a certain sensation, while what one feels at \(t’\), namely one’s left 
index finger, is another sensation, insofar as they are individuated by different 
intentionals – one’s big left toe and one’s left finger. To be sure, one would 
then have genuinely non-temporalized identities at one’s disposal – what one 
feels at \(t\) is the big left toe (one then sees), what one feels at \(t’\) is the left index 
finger (one then sees) – that would enable one to account for the sensations’ 
aspectuality. 
Yet this move would amount to denying the datum of migrant sensations, 
which states that what one feels at \(t\) and what one feels at \(t’\) are one and the 
same sensation. Such a denial would rather be \textit{ad hoc}, since Crane would not 
deny diachronical identity to a pain when its alleged object remains the same 
in different times (Crane would surely admit that e.g. my headache at \(t\) is the 
same as my headache at \(t’\) insofar as they are allegedly ‘directed upon’ the 
same part of my brain.) 
At this point, a defender of Crane’s version of intentionalism might be tempted 
by the following amendment of Crane’s own position. Instead of holding that the 
intentional object of a pain (or more generally of a proprioceptive sensation) is a 
portion of a physical body (\textit{Körper}), Crane might say that such an object is rather 
a portion of a lived body (\textit{Leib}), the lived target of one’s sensations postulated by 
Husserl (1989 [1913]). 
To be sure, there are reasons to defend the idea that, \textit{pace} Gallagher and 
Zahavi,\textsuperscript{29} a lived body is not epistemologically, but rather ontologically 

\textsuperscript{28} In the ‘phantom limb’- case, since the limb in question does not exist, it occupies no space 
region. As a result, an identity of the kind “this place (where one locates one’s sensation) is the 
place that one’s limb occupies” would be false. 
\textsuperscript{29} See Gallagher, Zahavi (2008, 136).
different from a physical body: that is, a lived and a physical body are not
two ways for identifying one and the same entity, but are genuinely different
entities (of a different kind, a physical and a phenomenological one). For the
two entities may well be different, insofar as they differ in their extension. As
the ‘phantom limb’- case (as well as our previous hypothetical cases) shows, a
lived body may be broader than a physical body (the limb in such a case is my
limb, although my physical body has no such limb). The opposite, i.e., that a
lived body is narrower than a physical body, is also true, insofar as there are
parts of one’s physical body that display no sensibility (e.g. the veins of one’s
physical body are not one’s veins, for one feels nothing in them).30
Moreover, there are independent reasons as to why one may commit to lived
bodies. Consider the following argument that Crane borrows from Block and
appears to be invalid:

(i) The pain is in my hand
(ii) My hand is in my trousers
(iii) Hence, the pain is in my trousers.31

As Crane says, the argument may be regarded as invalid for it suffers from a
fallacy of equivocation. Yet instead of locating the fallacy, as Crane explicitly
does, in a different meaning the preposition “in” has in the two premises –
according to him, in i) “in” means intentional individuation (the state of pain
is individuated by its putative object, i.e., the hand in question), while in ii)
“in” has it ordinary locative meaning32 – one might say that the description
“my hand” is ambiguous in the two premises, by denoting a part of one’s lived
body in (i) and a part of one’s physical body in (ii).
To be sure, the above reason is not so cogent. If one accepts that pain
localization may well amount to a false ascription, the argument may be valid
and yet unsound, for simply its premise i) may well be false. As a result, one
may well not be committed to lived bodies. Be that as it may, armed with lived
bodies a follower of Crane may reject the counterexamples I have previously
provided to the idea that pains have intentionality. First, the example of a pain
localized in the surrounding air does not show that pain has no intentional
object at all, but it rather shows that it has as such an object my air, as a part of
my lived body – as I noted above, in such a case the relevant

30 In the same vein, Wittgenstein once said (1975, §64) that it is unconceivable that we feel
pains at the tip of our (physical) nails or at our (physical) hairs.
32 See Crane (2001, 82-3).
subject would indeed say that such a pain is in the air out there pretty much as one ordinarily says that a pain is in the hand. Second, the case of migrant pains would simply show that one’s pain changes its object, it is first about my left big toe and then about my left index finger, inasmuch as at t I feel it in the left big toe while at t’ I feel it in the left index finger.

Yet in a Cranian perspective this amendment fares no better. Let me even put aside the problematic fact that, since Crane believes in the idea that the intentional object of a sensation individuates it, in the amendment he would still be forced to deny the datum of migrant sensations. For what we would have at our disposal would be a certain sensation at t (individuated by my left big toe) and another sensation at t’ (individuated by my left index finger). For the amendment entails the even more problematic fact for him that, if (a portion of) the lived body is the intentional object of a pain, then such an object is again a Brentanian immanent object, an object that depends on its existence on the existence of a living subject. My body is different from your body insofar as the former depends on me for its existence, while the latter depends on you for its existence. Yet as we have seen before Crane himself maintains that ascribing to a state a Brentanian immanent object does not happily account for the fact that such a state has intentionality of reference, understood in terms of the afore-mentioned essential features of being possibly about something that does not exist and having an aspectual shape. For there cannot be a non-existent part of a lived body, my lived body as well as its parts simply “in-exist”, i.e., they exist in a dependent way (on myself, as we have just seen). To put in the most extreme terms, even a brain in a vat has an existent lived body, so to say In this perspective, therefore, all intentionalia of sensation exist, insofar as they “in-exist”. It is then not the case that my phantom limb does not exist, for it exists, as well as all the parts of my lived body. Nor states about portions of a lived body can have aspectual shape.

For in order for the object of a pain to be recognized as being the same object given in different ways in different sensations respectively, that object must be a physical object (as Crane had in mind when saying that identities of the kind “what I feel is the leg I see” display one such recognition – the leg in question is one’s physical, not one’s lived, leg).

If all this is the case, then weak intentionalism fails. For the above remarks show that the fact that a state of pain (or any other proprioceptive sensation) has qualitative features cannot be matched by its having an objectual intentional content, hence by its having intentional properties. A fortiori, also strong intentionalism fails. As a further result, intentionality is not the mark of the mental, not even in the (BC) sense, for any such state is merely qualitative.
If intentionality is not the mark of the mental, not even in the (BC) sense, then whatever affects intentionality does not eo ipso affect mentality. For instance, suppose it turned out that the naturalization program regarding intentionality failed, so that intentionality is a non-natural property. Yet if it is not the case that all mental states are intentional, then if intentionality is not natural this does not mean that mental states are non-natural entities, or at least that all mental states are such.

Yet such a predicament seems to have a bad consequence. As Crane again has pointed out, if there were non-intentional qualitative states, for something to be a mental state would merely be an empty disjunctive characterization: mental states would merely be either intentional states or qualitative states. Being mental would therefore be something not very informative indeed. Yet to say that intentionality is not the mark of the mental, not even in the (BC) sense, does not mean that there are no other candidates that may successfully play this role. In the phenomenological tradition, Husserl (1970 [1900]) suggested that being conscious, rather than being intentional, is that mark: something is mental (if) and only if it is conscious, in the sense that it is experienced, at least nomologically possibly (as Searle would put it): an idea that nowadays some people also defend. Probably Crane himself would look with favor at such an idea. He indeed believes that being mental amounts to presenting itself to a subject, even though he further articulates such a belief (erroneously to my mind) in intentionalist terms, i.e., as if presentedness were for a state to be perspectival, to have aspectuality. Yet such an idea may be meant as the claim that any mental state has a phenomenal character, either sensuous or non-sensuous (depending on whether the state is a qualitative or an intentional state). Something Crane himself positively endorses.

One may immediately reply that if this move obviously covers all qualitative states – phenomenal awareness affects all of them – it does not cover all intentional states. According to this move, dispositional inner states having

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33 As I personally believe (See e.g. myVoltolini 2002).
36 See e.g. Strawson (1994, 2004).
37 As Brentano himself originally did, by substantially accepting that all mental states are conscious (in his terms, are objects of inner perception). See (1874, 91).
38 See Crane (2001, 4-6,31).
intentionality insofar as they can’t be accessed; they are merely informational states. But perhaps this is a price worth paying. We are indeed ready to consider sub-personal intentional states, states that cannot in principle be experienced, as merely informational states.\(^{40}\) Consider for instance a non-conscious state of vision, such as the one an eminegligent subject or another subject whose brain has been injured may entertain. Although the reactions of such a subject may prove that she entertains such a state for it gives her some information about the world, insofar as she has no awareness of it this state may well be regarded as non-mental. In this respect, note that Crane himself holds that there is a difference between dispositional states and occurrent intentional states: insofar as only the latter are experienced, a dispositional belief and an occurrent thought are entities of a different kind.\(^{41}\) Now, this difference is well accounted for if one precisely holds that unlike occurrent thoughts, dispositional states of belief are not mental states, but merely informational states. For although they provide some information about the world, they are not experienced, nor can they.

To be sure, since also these informational states are relevant in order to account for the behavior of the subject entertaining them, we need another category linking together such states and mental states qua experienced states. It may even be the case that, if it turned out that being experienced makes no functional difference as regards both mental states and corresponding underlying informational states – e.g. it turned out that both conscious and inconscious vision prompt in their similarly stimulated subjects the same kind of behavior, as some experiments seem to show –\(^{42}\) then being mental is an epiphenomenal feature of the state that possesses it. Yet this a story for another work.\(^{43}\)

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\(^{40}\) As Strawson (2004) would well be disposed to do.

\(^{41}\) See Crane (2001, 107-8).


\(^{43}\) Previous versions of this work have been presented in several seminars and workshops: The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality, Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, April 28-29 2008, Reggio Emilia; Workshop su Intenzionalità e coscienza, Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, Università di Milano, 29-30.5.2008, Milano; Autocoscienza e linguaggio. Filosofia e scienze cognitive, Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia, Università di Siena, 8-9.9.2011, Siena; Sense and Sensibility, University Vita-Salute S. Raffaele, January 17-18 2013, Milano; Consciousness and Intentionality, University of Salzburg, February 7-9 2013, Salzburg. I thank all the participants to these events for their important remarks. I particularly thank Elisabetta Sacchi who has painstakingly commented a previous draft of the paper.
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