INTRODUCTION
The papers collected in this number of *Phenomenology and Mind* aim at analyzing Max Scheler’s work and understanding to what extent his reflection can be useful to current debates – in particular as far as values, emotions, and norms are concerned.

Max Ferdinand Scheler (Munich, 1874 - Frankfurt, 1928) was one of the most prolific German intellectuals of his time and a pioneer in phenomenology. The first encounter with phenomenology happened in 1902, when Scheler met Edmund Husserl. In Munich, where he came back in 1906 after he completed his studies in Berlin and Jena, he established, together with Theodor Lipps, the circle of the “Munich Phenomenologists”. Some of the members of this group were: Maximillian Beck, Theodor Conrad, Moritz Geiger, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Herbert Leyendecker, Hedwig Martius, and Alexander Pfänder.

His thinking touches on a huge variety of areas both within philosophy and in other related fields and it gives rise to a variety of questions that have been and are still central in different domains.

As the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, rightly notices:

A pioneer in the development of phenomenology in the early part of the 20th century, Scheler broke new ground in many areas of philosophy and established himself as perhaps the most creative of the early phenomenologists. Relative to the attention his work received and the attention his contemporaries now enjoy, interest in Scheler’s work and thought waned considerably. This decrease in attention is in part due to the suppression of Scheler’s work by the Nazis from 1933–1945, a suppression stemming from his Jewish heritage and outspoken denunciation of fascism and National Socialism. Nevertheless, his work has survived and continues to be read and translated throughout the world, serving as evidence of the creative depth and richness of his thought (Davis, and Steinbock 2013).

In deciding which domains within his extensive work we wanted to focus on, we were enlightened by Zahavi’s reflections (Zahavi 2010).

Scheler’s strength as a phenomenological thinker is undoubtedly to be found in his concrete analyses – in particular in his analyses of emotional life and sociality (Zahavi 2010, p. 175).
Taking seriously this insight, we focused on three particular aspects of his thought. We never thought of them as being exhaustive as far as Scheler’s work is concerned, but we thought they might be particularly interesting both because of Scheler’s contribution *per se* and because of its possible relevance in contemporary debates.

The three domains we wanted to focus on are: emotions, values, and norms. According to this distinction, we invited our contributors to focus on one of these domains.

But, before entering into the details about the sections of this number, we would like to spend a few words about the great opportunity we had to reprint part of the third chapter of Wolfgang Köhler’s *An analysis of Requiredness*, who also provided the idea for the title of the present number of *Phenomenology and Mind*.

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The selection, which is particularly relevant for the topic of the present issue, is introduced by Roberta De Monticelli’s words.

As we have mentioned, the first Section of the present number of *Phenomenology and Mind* concerns emotions. Our interest was on the essential properties of emotions and on their role in our interaction with others in a social context.

Our first invited contribution is by Andrea Zhok (University of Milan). In his *On Scheler’s metaphysics of love: an appraisal* Andrea Zhok recollects some of Scheler’s main arguments concerning the status of “affective life” and tries a sympathetic appraisal of the bearing of these theses. After resuming Scheler’s assessment of love and showing its conceptual connections with intentionality, spiritual values and sensuous corporeality, Andrea Zhok sketches an account of the ontological and axiological role of love. Love turns out to be interpretable as a pervasive drive that shapes both natural and cultural history, while history, in its most comprehensive sense, is not viewed either as sheer contingency or as teleology, but rather as an exploratory cosmological venture.

The aim of our second invited paper by Francesca Forlè (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan) and Daniela Perani (Vita-Salute San Raffaele
University, Nuclear Medicine Department and Division of Neuroscience San Raffaele Scientific Institute, Milan) in their *Emotions in Music. An Overview of Musical Expressive Qualities* is two-fold. On the one hand, the authors describe the emotional and affective power of music by means of the analysis of *music expressive qualities - tertiary qualities or value-qualities* that emerge from the structure of the musical objects. On the other, they focus on *rhythm* as one of the “core contributors” for music expressiveness, giving also a phenomenological account of rhythmic perception.

Roberta Guccinelli (Member of the Max Scheler Gesellschaft, Italian translator of Scheler’s *Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt Toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism*), in her *When the Facts “Call down Vengeance”. Feeling of Revenge, Sensibility to Injustice and (a Hint at) Retributive Justice in Scheler’s Formalism*, aims at providing an elucidation of what, at first sight, appears as a specific and negative affective phenomenon, namely that of revenge, which, although its sinister popularity, constantly risks to be muddled with a simple state of excitement deprived of intentionality or with a kind of “justice without justice”. The understanding of the nature of revenge and of impulse of revenge allows to enlighten a peculiar feeling’s class, to which revenge in a certain sense belongs to, and to investigate the meaning and the sense of Scheler’s ambiguous term “Vergeltung”, in order to attribute to retributive model of justice, by a comparison with revenge, its correct role and place in the world of Scheler’s. The author’s back-idea is the one according to which refining sensibility to injustices can contribute to a primary form of identity, namely that of our living body.

The first of our contributor’s papers for this first *Section*, by Luigina Mortani (University of Verona) and Federica Valbusa (University of Verona), focuses on a particular role that emotions can play. In their *Affective Responses and Personal Flourishing*, they analyze the connection between personal flourishing and affective states. In particular, the paper reconstructs, develops and discusses Scheler’s *Bildung* theory to highlight its relevance for educational philosophy. The authors point out that a personality flourishes through a process of progressive individuation which is modulated by affective maturation and promoted by the encounter with an exemplarity.

Finally, Anna Piazza (Universität Erfurt, MAX-WEBER-KOLLEG für Kultur- und sozialwissenschaftliche Studien), in her *Scheler’s foundation of ethics*, deals with Scheler’s emotional ethics and its relationship with a possible ontological foundation. The author addresses the theme of values and acts,
asking whether they are rooted in being or whether they possess their status autonomously, and where they obtain their legality and consistency from.

This last contribution introduces the theme of values – as it is connected with that of emotions. Leading us to the theme of our second Section.

In the second Section, as we have mentioned, our interest was that of understanding what are values in Scheler’s work and how his reflections can improve contemporary debates about them. We also wanted our contributors to elaborate on the existence of an order of values, on its possible objectivity, and on the role of this order of values for the constitution of a personal ethos. Finally, we were particularly interested in understanding what can be drawn from Scheler’s works on the relationship between “values” and “facts”, and whether his Value Theory can be conceived of as a reformulation of the is-ought question.

Roberta De Monticelli (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan), in her Requiredness. An argument for value-realism, addresses the problem of the ontological status of values. Our invited author defends several arguments in favour of Axiological Realism, a specific version of the thesis about the objectivity of values. Roberta De Monticelli’s aim is that of answering the question posed by Wolfgang Köhler in the book from which we extracted the paragraphs published in this volume, so that this paper provides also a theoretical reflection stemming from those pages. So, what is An analysis of Requiredness? The arguments proposed are based on a principle of non-reducibility of integral wholes to sums, as informally developed by Gestalt theorists, systematically worked out by Husserl in his III Logical Investigation on wholes and parts, and exploited by Max Scheler’s theory of material and axiological a priori.

The second invited paper of this Section is by Veniero Venier (Udine University). In Governing Emotions. Husserl and Personal Vocation, the author deals with Husserl central question about the creation of a personal order, related to values and their cognition. An order in which the fundamental structure of the actual idea of a person is revealed: that of being the essential tie between feeling, motivation of volition and logical-argumentative coherence. This value is felt emotionally but the true understanding of the value only occurs in rational choice, when feeling is concretely translated into value.
Our first contributor in this Section is Virginia Sanchini (FOLSATEC, Department of Experimental Oncology, European Institute of Oncology (IEO), Italy; Department of Health Sciences, University of Milan, Italy; European School of Molecular Medicine (SEMM)) with her paper: Not Kant vs. Scheler, but either Kant or Scheler. From Construction to Foundation of Ethics. In the author’s view, Scheler’s moral theory is often presented as a critical reaction to Kantian formalism. The majority of contributions on this topic deals with Scheler’s proposal of an \textit{a priori} material ethics in contrast with the \textit{a priori} formal ethics developed by Kant, or with the critical analysis of the eight prejudices ascribed by Scheler to Kant. A very few of them, however, explore their respective foundational attempts to see why such a conflict actually arises. The paper addresses the foundational issue. It will be shown that the disagreement between the two authors should not be ascribed to a real incompatibility, but rather to a different way of conceiving what the foundation of ethics actually is.

James Edward Hackett (University of Akron, Akron, Ohio), in his The Case for Participatory Realism in Scheler’s Ethics, believes, following Phil Blosser, that the major defect of Scheler’s philosophy of values lies in the fact of not being clear about values’ ontological status. In his paper, the author argues that being-an-act (\textit{Akt-sein}) provides us with insight into Scheler’s value ontology. The thesis rests on two fundamental premises: showing how Scheler’s phenomenology opens up into ontology, and how being-an-act is understood with that opening in mind in Scheler’s Idealism and Realism essay.

Susi Ferrarello (Loyola University, Chicago; Saybrook University, San Francisco) has three goals in her Values, Normativity and Facts: firstly, to describe the relation between values, norms, and facts; secondly, to consider whether norms are a constituent part of the essence of values; and, finally, to define the boundaries of axiology. To reach these goals the author presents an historical-phenomenological reconstruction of the relationship between values, norms and facts.

As it has happened for the last contribution of the first Section, this last contribution is somehow a bridge from the second to the third Section of our volume, as it introduces and debates the connection between values and norms.

The third and last Section concerns norms, their essential properties in Scheler’s account, the role they play in relation to Scheler’s Value Theory, and the potential relevance of Scheler’s reflections for contemporary debate about them.
In *Norms without Values. Philosophical Reflections on Carl Schmitt’s Tyranny of Values*, Paola Premoli De Marchi (Adjunct Professor of Ethics, FISPPA, University of Padua), by reference to Carl Schmitt’s *The Tyranny of Values* (1954), asks whether norms can be justified without reference to values. The paper focuses on the premises of Schmitt’s perspective and aims to show that the rejection of values as foundation of civil laws depends upon some *philosophical* assumptions, even though Schmitt defined himself a jurist and not a philosopher. The first part of the paper is dedicated to explain the historical background of Schmitt’s notion of value. The second part introduces the content of *Tyranny of Values* concerning the relation between norms and values. Afterwards, the author explains the main thesis defended by Schmitt, namely the relationship between the posing of values and aggressiveness, and investigates its theoretical premises. The fourth part addresses the question of how norms can be justified without values, in Schmitt’s view. And, finally, the author aims to reply to Schmitt’s rejection of values by drawing on some insights by Scheler, who is the main exponent of the value theory attacked in the *Tyranny of Values*.

Again on the relation between norms and values, Davide Fassio (University of Geneva) focuses on the distinction between the two concepts. It is difficult to find decisive criteria by which to distinguish norms from values. In his *How to Distinguish Norms from Values*, the author focuses on analyzing the essential properties of norms, that are not ascribable to values themselves. The relevant properties, possessed by the former but not by the latter, are that norms are directed to some addressees, possess conditions of satisfaction and are supposed to guide and motivate their addressees to satisfy these conditions. To come to such a conclusion, Davide Fassio focuses on different traditional ways of distinguishing between the two and on the traditional criteria of such a differentiation. The aim of the paper is not that of arguing against the existence of a relation between the two domain, but rather that of finding the criteria for a conceptual distinction based on the properties that each one has or has not.

Olimpia Giuliana Loddo (University of Cagliari), in her contribution *Rules of Distribution and the Concept of “Egalitarianism” in Felix Oppenheim. Towards Understanding Distribution*, reconstructs Felix Oppenheim’s description of “egalitarianism” on the basis of rules of distribution. Afterwards, the author reverses Oppenheim’s perspective by analyzing the role of distributives rules and of “egalitarianism” towards understanding distribution. In what measure does the concept of “egalitarianism” help us to understand
distribution? Is it possible to understand a distribution only on the basis of descriptive concepts? As Olimpia Giuliana Loddo points out, in order to choose consciously between two or more rules of distribution we need to adopt a value judgement on the content of that rule. So that, in the author’s view, values can represent a peculiar point of view that allows us to perceive, on the one hand, selected aspects of rules of distribution and, on the other hand, the peculiar ethical meaning of the (rule-governed) practice of distribution. Even considering very practical issues such as egalitarianism and distribution, values play a distinctive role and Scheler’s work proves itself to be extremely useful for contemporary and everyday life issues in political and social context.

Essien D. Essien (Department of Religious and Cultural Studies, University of Uyo, Akwa Ibom State, Nigeria) examines, in his *The Hidden Dimension of Social Norms in Ibibio: Tri-Tangential Trajectory of Ibibio Indigenuos Knowledge on Morality*, a very specific set of norm. In particular, the author focuses on the hidden ethical elements of norms in Ibibio culture and its day-to-day manifestations within the periscope of ethical prerequisite. The paper presents a socio-cultural description of Ibibio norms which are an integral part of the culture, social custom, rituals and beliefs governing social coexistence. It argues that, though norms are a cultural production with emphasis on prohibitions, Ibibio norms dictate behavioral and/or conversational re-orientation.

The last content of this volume are two book reviews of the new Italian translation of Max Scheler *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus*, published by Bompiani and edited by Roberta Guccinelli (2013). We wanted to give some space to this new and extremely relevant translation by Roberta Guccinelli (Member of the Max Scheler Gesellschaft, Italian translator of Scheler’s *Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt Toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism*) and we did so by asking Barbara Malvestiti (University of Milan) and Jonathan Bazzi (Vita-Salute San Raffaele University) to review the new translation. We hope these contents can provide some insight on Formalism, to guide its reading, and provide some interpretative tools for those who want to approach such a deep work by Max Ferdinand Scheler.

In the end, as invited editors, we would like to thank all the contributors, those who were invited by us and those who answered our call for papers,
both for their interesting contributions and for their responsiveness and kindness. We also wanted to thank the reviewers for their comments on the papers and their helpfulness. Finally, our gratitude goes to the Editorial Board – Francesca Boccuni, Stefano Cardini, Roberta De Monticelli, Francesca De Vecchi, Serena Rizzello – for all the support and advice they gave us throughout the production of this volume. We would like to thank also IUSS Press, our publishing house, in the person of Roberta Lucentini.
REFERENCES


